VAMPIRE ATTACKS: DRAINING LIFE FROM WIRELESS AD-HOC SENSOR NETWORKS

   Vampire attacks: Draining life from wireless

                  ad-hoc sensor networks

                

                                                                                                                              Ad-hoc low-power wireless networks are an exciting research direction in sensing and pervasive computing. Prior security work in this area has focused primarily on denial of communication at the routing or medium access control levels. This paper explores resource depletion attacks at the routing protocol layer, which permanently disable networks by quickly draining nodes’ battery power.

          These “Vampire” attacks are not specific to any specific protocol, but rather rely on the properties of many popular classes of routing protocols. We find that all examined protocols are susceptible to Vampire attacks, which are devastating, difficult to detect, and are easy to carry out using as few as one malicious insider sending only protocol compliant messages.

 EXISTING SYSTEM

                    

          Existing work on secure routing attempts to ensure that adversaries cannot cause path discovery to return an invalid network path, but Vampires do not disrupt or alter discovered paths, instead using existing valid network paths and protocol compliant messages. Protocols that maximize power efficiency are also inappropriate, since they rely on cooperative node behavior and cannot optimize out malicious action.

PROPOSED SYSTEM

                

                  In proposed system we show simulation results quantifying the performance of several representative protocols in the presence of a single Vampire. Then, we modify an existing sensor network routing protocol to provably bind the damage from Vampire attacks during packet forwarding.

Implementation

                     Implementation is the stage of the project when the theoretical design is turned out into a working system. Thus it can be considered to be the most critical stage in achieving a successful new system and in giving the user, confidence that the new system will work and be effective.

                        The implementation stage involves careful planning, investigation of the existing system and it’s constraints on implementation, designing of methods to achieve changeover and evaluation of changeover methods.

Problem Statement:

                  

                             Vampire attacks are not protocol-specific, in that they do not rely on design properties or implementation faults of particular routing protocols, but rather exploit general properties of protocol classes such as link-state, distance-vector, source routing and geographic and beacon routing.

                  

                             Neither do these attacks rely on flooding the network with large amounts of data, but rather try to transmit as little data as possible to achieve the largest energy drain, preventing a rate limiting solution. Since Vampires use protocol-compliant messages, these attacks are very difficult to detect and prevent.

Scope:    

                             This paper makes three primary contributions. First, we thoroughly evaluate the vulnerabilities of existing protocols to routing layer battery depletion attacks. Existing work on secure routing attempts to ensure that adversaries cannot cause path discovery to return an invalid network path, but Vampires do not disrupt or alter discovered paths, instead using existing valid network paths and protocol compliant  messages.

                             Second, we show simulation results quantifying the performance of several representative protocols in the presence of a single Vampire (insider adversary). Third, we modify an existing sensor network routing protocol to provably bind the damage from Vampire attacks during packet forwarding.

MODULE DESCRIPTION:

Data-Verification  

              In data verification module, receiver verifies the path. Suppose data come with malicious node means placed in malicious packet. Otherwise data placed in honest packet. This way user verifies the data’s.

Denial of service

          In computing, a denial-of-service attack or distributed denial-of-service attack is an attempt to make a machine or network resource unavailable to its intended users. Although the means to carry out, motives for, and targets of a DoS attack may vary, it generally consists of efforts to temporarily or indefinitely interrupt or suspend services of a host connected to the Internet.

User Module

                    In user module, verify user and any time create a new path. In security purpose user give the wrong details means display wrong node path otherwise display correct node path.

Stretch Attack

                    Stretch attack, where a malicious node constructs artificially long source routes, causing packets to traverse a larger than optimal number of nodes. An honest source would select the route Source → F → E → Sink, affecting four nodes including itself, but the malicious node selects a longer route, affecting all nodes in the network. These routes cause nodes that do not lie along the honest route to consume energy by forwarding packets they would not receive in honest scenarios.

System Configuration:-

                   H/W System Configuration:-

          Processor                        -    Pentium –III

     Speed                                -    1.1 Hz

     RAM                                 -    256 MB (min)

     Hard Disk                          -   20 GB

     Floppy Drive                     -    1.44 MB

     Key Board                         -    Standard Windows Keyboard

     Mouse                                -    Two or Three Button Mouse

     Monitor                              -    SVGA

                   S/W System Configuration:-

Operating System              : Windows XP

Front End                          :   JAVA, RMI, SWING

CONCLUSION

          We defined Vampire attacks, a new class of resource consumption attacks that use routing protocols to permanently disable ad-hoc wireless sensor networks by depleting nodes’ battery power. These attacks do not depend on particular protocols or implementations, but rather expose vulnerabilities in a number of popular protocol classes. We showed a number of proof-of-concept attacks against representative examples of existing routing protocols using a small number of weak adversaries, and measured their attack success on a randomly-generated topology of 30 nodes.